



Directorate of Intelligence

~~SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~



63

Terrorism Review



63

28 July 1988

Approved for Release
Date JUN 1999

~~Secret~~
~~NOFORN~~
28 July 1988
Copy

63

315

~~TOP SECRET~~

Terrorism Review **b3**

29 July 1988

1	Focus: The Shootdown of Iran Air 655; Will Iran Retaliate? b3
5	Highlights b3 Counterterrorist Center
9	[REDACTED] b3
11	The ANC: Changing Military Policy b1 b3
13	[REDACTED] b3 b3
19	The Terrorism Diary for September b3 Counterterrorist Center
23	Chronology of Terrorism—1988 b3 Counterterrorist Center


[REDACTED] **b3**

Reverse Blank

~~TOP SECRET~~ **b3**

~~Secret~~

b1, b3



The Shootdown, the Hqj, and the Hostages

A terrorist operation directed by Iran or a surrogate is not the only way Tehran could threaten US interests. Iranian rhetoric against Washington could also incite Islamic extremists into violent demonstrations. We believe the most vulnerable period for this kind of activity is during Friday prayers, during the annual pilgrimage (the Hajj) to Saudi Arabia, and on 12-13 August, the fortieth day following the shootdown. This last date is a traditional day of mourning, which will coincide this year with observance of the Islamic new year. On the 10th day of the month of Muharram—called Ashura—Shias commemorate the martyrdom of the son-in-law and grandson of the Prophet with passion plays and ritual flagellation

b1, b3



~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

b1, b3

[REDACTED]

• US interests in Bahrain or Kuwait are convenient, suitable targets. Both states have large, Iranian-origin populations and military-security agreements with the United States. In the past year, pro-Iranian terrorists have bombed several facilities in Kuwait, including US-related airlines offices and private companies.

b1, b3

[REDACTED]

• Tehran could draw on its extensive assets in Dubai to rally protest demonstrations—which could easily turn to violence—or mount a terrorist operation. Iran Air Flight 655 was heading for Dubai, and many Iranians there apparently had relatives on board the aircraft.

• Hizballah terrorists who were responsible for the April 1988 hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner could try to hijack a US airliner or place explosives on board one. They would probably try to mount this kind of operation from an Asian or African airport where security is lax, American targets are more accessible, and local support networks are in place.

• Hizballah or Islamic fundamentalists linked to Iran could attempt an attack against US interests in Europe. We believe Greece and Cyprus are likely venues, but Hizballah and Iran have assets in many European cities that could be drawn on to support an operation.

b1, b3

[REDACTED]

Shaykh Fadlallah, Hizballah's spiritual guide, denounced the downing of the airliner shortly after the incident but said it had nothing to do with the fate of the Western hostages. In a subsequent statement made during a recent Islamic holiday, he called for a "happy ending" to the hostages' ordeal and urged Tehran to press for their release as a humanitarian gesture.

b1, b3

[REDACTED]

Like Tehran, however, he has only a limited influence over the Hizballah terrorists holding the remaining foreign hostages. Hizballah will certainly use the hostages to issue press statements denouncing the United States and will make the conditions of their detention more miserable and threatening than they apparently have been.

[REDACTED]

b3

~~Secret~~